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LAW, ORDER AND DEMOCRACY: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIARY IN A 
PROGRESSIVE STATE-THE 
SASKATCHEWAN EXPERIENCE 
S. DAVID COHEN* 
ABSTRACT 
Current legal debates on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada have 
focused on the apparent shift in the location of power from elected 
representatives to the judiciary since 1982. In this paper, I take an historical 
perspective on that issue. I will explore the relationship of political power, as 
exercised by the judiciary through the interpretation of legislation, with concepts 
of parliamentary supremacy in Saskatchewan during the f is t  half of this century. 
The paper first describes the political character of the judiciary in 
Saskatchewan from 1905 until 1941, and then describes the political movements 
which gave rise to the enactment of "progressive" legislation in Saskatchewan 
during the same era. The relationship between the judiciary and the legislative 
branches of government is developed through an analysis of several pieces of 
legislation introduced during this period, and of several hundred cases in which 
that legislation was applied by the judiciary. 
The results of the analysis indicate a significant difference in the number of 
cases decided in favour of creditors as compared to debtors in this period. In the 
final section of the paper, I explore several possible explanations for this 
difference and suggest that identification with the economic interests of creditors 
may be the most persuasive explanation for the data. 
Associate Professor of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We do not know a great deal about Adolphe Poirier. What we do know from 
his experience with the legal system during the Great Depression in 
Saskatchewan is not pleasant. In 1935, Adolphe Poirier, a Saskatchewan farmer, 
was in danger of losing his farm. In the late fall of that year, Poirier sought 
protection from his creditor's claims, under the recently enacted Farmers' 
Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934.' Under the Act, his remaining funds were 
deposited with an Official Receiver, but his application to the Board of Review 
established under the Act was refused. As a result of the rejected proposal, on 
January 3, 1936, the District Court of Saskatchewan ordered the money held by 
the Official Receiver to be distributed to his creditors, including the Banque 
Canadienne Nationale. 
Adolphe Poirier had ten days to appeal the decision. He took thirty-one days 
to appeal, and was not permitted to do so. His explanation for the delay was 
simple-he swore that he intended to appeal the decision, but could not because 
the funds necessary to pay his lawyer were in the hands of the Official Receiver, 
and were not available to him as a direct result of the decision from which he 
sought to appeal. 
Adolphe Poirier sought a review of this decision at the Saskatchewan King's 
Bench, arguing that the judge ought to exercise his discretion to extend the time 
for filing the appeal under the circumstances. Bigelow J., of whom we know 
nothing more than the little we know of Adolphe P~ i r i e r ,~  said that it was not for 
him to decide whether the order was right or not. Adolphe Poirier lost his 
appeal.3 This paper is an attempt to understand this case and some two hundred 
and seventy cases like it decided in Saskatchewan during the first half of this 
century. 
The origins of this paper are found in two events separated by almost thirty 
years. The first was the publication of Agrarian Socialism: The Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan in 1950. In Agrarian Socialism, 
Seymour Lipset describes the genesis of the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (CCF) party in Western Canada, the first socialist provincial or state 
' S.C. 1934, c. 53. 
H.V. Bigelow, K.C., was counsel for a mortgagee in Fawell v. Andrew, [I9171 34 D.L.R. 12 
(S.C.), March 10, 1917. Counsel for the mortgagor was successful in representations dealing 
with a distress issue and the mortgagor's debt was suspended. During the same year the 
Supreme Court of Saskatchewan was renamed the Court of King's Bench, and Bigelow was 
appointed as a Puisne Judge. He remained a Puisne Judge on the King's Bench until 1949. See 
[1917-181 10 S.L.R. iii; The Canadian Law List (Toronto: Hardy's, 1949) at 593. He did not 
return to private practice in Saskatchewan. Before his appointment, Bigelow practised law in 
Regina as a partner in the firm of Bigelow and Kinsman. The Canadian Law List (Toronto: 
Hardy's, 1949) at 215. 
Poirier v. North American Life Assurance Company et al. ,  [I9361 17 Can. Bank. Rep. 255. 
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government in North A m e r i ~ a . ~  When I read the book, I slowly realized that 
most of the "legal" institutions and ideas with which I was familiar were 
invisible. What is remarkable about Lipset's description and analysis of the 
development of the CCF is the absence of any description of, or reflection on, 
the part played by the judiciary in the implementation of the CCF legislative 
platform. Reading the text leads one to believe that all legislation is 
unambiguous and self-enforcing; all the CCF needed to do in order to fulfil its 
electoral promises was to enact legislation and that would be the end of the 
story. My sense of politics and law 'led me to believe that enacting legislation 
could very well represent only an intermediate stage in the ongoing process of 
political dialogue. 
The second event (or rather series of events) which led to this research was the 
immediate and continuing debate about the way in which the judiciary might 
utilize the Charter to constrain progressive legislative agendas.' The parallel 
literature is immense and, while important, is largely uninspiring in the way in 
which it fails to answer its own ultimate question. One answer may be found in 
the introduction of the writer's own hopes and political agendas through the 
interpretation of appellate decisions and by the development of arguments 
articulated within the framework of traditional legal materials and rhetoric6 
These two ideas came together in 1990 with the publication of Seymour 
Lipset's second book on Canadian politics-Continental Divide: The Values and 
S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Co-operarive Commonwealth Federation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1950). 
See, for example, A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private RightslPublic Wrongs: The Liberal 
Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278. The debate continues today with the recent 
contribution of Judy Fudge who has responded to the somewhat naive but optimistic writings 
of two political scientists on the use of law as a progressive instrument of social 
transformation. See J. Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social Transformation" (1990) 
5 Can. J. of Law and Soc. 47. It is not surprising that the debate is most often engaged in by the 
progressives, because progressives have the most to lose through the apparent metamorphosis 
of political dialogue into legal rhetoric. See M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the 
Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989). 
The naive hope for judicial radicalism is remarkable in its simultaneous honesty and unreality. 
That one can read history and still argue that judges will come to the aid of the homeless, poor 
and oppressed reflects the sincerity of the beliefs of the writers and little else. Recent examples 
of Canadian writing suggesting a progressive role for the judiciary include: Parkdale 
Community Legal Services, "Homelessness and the Right to Shelter: A View from Parkdale" 
(1988) 4 J. of Law and Soc. Policy 33 at 67.; M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights 
Under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L.R. 257; K. Ruff, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: A Tool for Social Justice ?'( (1988-89) 13 Perception 19. 
One of the more important contributions to the literature, and one which recognizes the 
"false optimism" surrounding the world of the Charter debate is J. Bakan, "Constitutional 
Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You 
Need)" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Edmond 
Montgomery, 1991) at 445. 
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Institutions of the United States and Canada.' Lipset implies that the Canadian 
courts in 1950 were somehow political eunuchs, characterized by deference and 
neutrality in political matters. He suggests that the Charter represents a 
revolutionary change in Canadian legal culture, almost eliminating the 
difference between Canadian and American legal cultures.' He also believes that 
Canadian courts were obsessively respectful of other political actors, exercising 
judicial self-restraint and deference to legislative judgment. One commentator 
notes, "[Canadian] judges and lawyers, supported by the press and public 
opinion, reject any concept of the courts as positive instruments in the political 
pro~ess."~ 
The research which I describe below represents an initial attempt to improve 
the understanding of the connection between law and politics, and between 
judges and legislators in Canada. First, I hope to add a level of description to 
Lipset's work by describing one Saskatchewan judiciary, and by investigating 
the response of that judiciary to progressive legislation over a forty year period 
from 1905 until 1944. Second, I interpret that data and offer to those engaged in 
the current debate enveloping the Charter of Rights and Freedoms a systematic, 
historical appraisal of the cases as an indication of what we might expect of the 
judiciary in Canada who have taken on the power to affect public policy. 
This paper has three parts. In the first, I briefly describe the political character 
of the judiciary in Saskatchewan. Like virtually all who have studied the 
question of political patronage in the judicial selection process in Canada, I 
conclude that the judiciary in Saskatchewan during this century was not 
comprised of lawyers who were associated with either the CCF or NDP prior to 
their appointment. In the second part, I identify several examples of important 
"progressive" legislative enactments introduced in Saskatchewan which 
contemplate the continuation of market transactions, but which purport to alter 
the balance of power and the outcome under those Acts. I then analyze 269 cases 
in which judges have applied those statutes in particular situations. I conclude 
that, on balance, the judiciary favoured creditors over debtors, although the bias 
is clearly not universal. I also conclude that the data aggregating judicial 
responses to the legislation support those who argue that judges decided cases in 
a way which consistently interfered with progressive legislative agendas. 
Finally, I suggest that one must be cautious in interpreting data which compares 
case outcomes based on variables such as class. Further, the data may 
demonstrate a more pervasive and complex set of institutional and personal 
factors influencing judicial decision-making than one might first conclude. 
' See S.M. Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and institutions of the United States and 
Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
'  bid. at I 02. 
K. McNaught, "Political Trials and the Canadian Political Tradition" in M. Friedland, ed., 
Courts and Trials: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) 
at 138. 
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11. THE JUDICIARY 
The potential conflict between the judiciary and the provincial legislative 
branch of governments is derived from the constitutional power of the federal 
government to appoint superior court judges.1° Although the provinces have 
legislative authority over the administration of justice, there is no doubt that 
Ottawa exercises formal powers of judicial appointment. While it is possible that 
the federal government could defer to provincial political agendas in making 
judicial appointments, there is no evidence that Ottawa appointed progressive 
lawyers to the Saskatchewan judiciary during the relevant period. 
My analysis of the judiciary in Saskatchewan is, in part, derived from 
anecdotal descriptions of the judges in local legal periodicals. Very little of that 
literature reveals the political affiliations of the judges." However, there is at 
least some writing which makes explicit reference to the political affiliation of 
judges.'' The definitive work in this area describes the careers of fifteen of the 
more important members of the Superior Court in Saskatchewan from 1907 until 
1980. In all but one case, there was a direct connection between the judge and 
one of the major federal or provincial political parties; however, in no case was 
the judge associated with the CCF.I3 
Such anecdotal descriptions of the political activity of particular judges are 
consistent with the more organized analyses of the political character of judicial 
appointments in Canada and Saskatchewan.14 Research generating this empirical 
data on the judiciary in Saskatchewan is made easier by the relatively small 
provincial population and the equally small number of lawyers who represent 
the population from which the judges were selected. For example, in 1957, there 
were only 441 practising lawyers in the province, of whom 421 were resident in 
Saskatchewan.'' 
lo  See Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) ,  30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
' I  Most involved obituaries or public speeches on formal occasions. See "Editorial" (1955) 20 
Sask. Bar Rev. 1,21,57; "Minutes of the Law Society" (1957) 22 Sask. Bar Rev. 67. 
See "Obituary on Mr. J.W. Estey" (1956) 21 Sask. Bar Rev. 3 (Liberal Cabinet Minister); 
"Obituary of Judge V.R. Smith" (1960) 24 Sask. Bar Rev. 39, 40; "Obituary of Hon. R.C. 
Davis, Q.C." (1960) 24 Sask. Bar Rev. 38, 39; "A Tribute to Retiring Members of the 
Saskatchewan Judiciary" (1961) 24 Sask. Bar Rev. 42, 44 (Hon. W.M. Martin as Liberal 
Member of Parliament; Mr. Justice Graham as Member of Parliament). 
l 3  W.H. McConnell, Prairie Justice (Calgary: Burroughs & Co., 1980) Chap. 6, "Provincial 
Superior Court Judges." 
l 4  See W.A. Angus, "Judicial Selection in Canada-The Historical Perspective" (1967) 1 Can. 
Leg. Stud. 220. 
l5 
"Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Law Society" (1957) 22 Sask. Bar Rev. 67 at 68. This 
report indicates that the numbers were shrinking as lawyers left the province. It appears that the 
population of lawyers peaked at about 650 prior to 1927, with 634 lawyers enrolled in the Law 
Society in that year. 
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In 1966, a survey of judicial appointments to the superior courts in Canada 
from 1945-1965 reviewed the political affiliation of twenty Saskatchewan 
appointments. All twenty of the appointees had known political affiliations: 
eleven (55%) being associated with the Liberal Party; and nine (45%) associated 
with the Conservatives. 100% of the judges were appointed by their own party.I6 
Recent commentary suggests that this practice has been pervasive since 
Confederation and continues today. From the earliest days of Confederation 
judicial appointments by the federal government have been highly politicized, 
not only in the sense that the party in power has rewarded its own supporters but 
also in the sense that appointments have been frequently made on the grounds of 
friendship, professional or familial ties and departmental morale.'' 
A recent study by the Canadian Bar Association describes "a long history of 
patronage appointments to the Bench by both major parties in Canada."IS It 
specifically describes the patronage role in Saskatchewan as very strong, and 
details an incident in recent years where the Saskatchewan government was 
forced to amend provincial legislation to prevent the appointment of judges by 
the Liberal government in power in Ottawa.Ig 
All the evidence confirms that the judges in Saskatchewan from 1905 until 
1965 were either Liberal or Conservative, and certainly not known supporters of 
either the CCF or the New Democratic Party. As Peter Russell has stated, the 
requirement that a judicial candidate be of the "right" ideological persuasion has 
meant that lawyers identified with the New Democratic Party have "rarely been 
appointed to judgeships even in provinces where that party holds power."'O 
111. THE LEGISLATION AND CASES 
Since the turn of the century, prairie governments in general and, in particular, 
Saskatchewan governments of all political persuasions, have responded 
aggressively to the political demands of the farming ~ommunity.'~ One response 
l6  See "A Survey of Judicial Appointments to Canadian Superior Courts 1945-1965." Presented 
to the 1966 Annual Meeting of the Association of Canadian Law Teachers at the University of 
Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Quebec, June 1966; Appendix " A  to the 1969 Annual Repon of the 
Section on Administration of Justice of the Association of Canadian Law Teachers. 
" See J.S. Ziegel, "Federal Judicial Appointments in Canada: The Time is Ripe for Change" in 
Judicial Selection in Canada, Discussion Papers and Reports, Prepared for the Canadian 
Association of Law Teachers Special Committee on the Appointment of Judges, (1987) at 45. 
P.H. Russell, The Judiciary in Canadn; The Third Branch of Government (Toronto: McGraw- 
Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 1 15-17. 
I s  Repon of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Appointment of Judges in Canada 
(1985) at 9. 
l9 Ibid. at 9, 37-40. 
Supra, note 17 at 1 17. 
'I I began this project with the idea of looking only at legislation introduced in Saskatchewan 
from 1944 until the mid-1960's when the New Democratic Party was defeated. However, the 
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by Saskatchewan governments to the needs of the farming community was to 
enact legislation delimiting the enforcement of certain limited aspects of market 
 transaction^.^^ This legislation restricted the contractual rights of financial 
CCF and subsequently, the NDP did not institute substantial changes to the existing legislation 
which had been introduced to benefit the farming community. The legislation which was 
introduced was not the subject of sufficient judicial decisions to warrant the kind of analysis 
presented here. 
The legislation which I examined was largely a product of legislatures which were sensitive 
to the economic conditions of the Prairie farmer. Saskatchewan politics from 1905-1964 
exhibited a consistent pattern of responsiveness to agrarian interests. From 1905 until 1929, the 
Liberal party was closely tied to the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association. After the First 
World War the Liberal Party's hold on power was challenged by the Progressive Movement, 
but the neutrality of the Grain Growers' during this era led to linkages between the Progressive 
Movement and the United Farmers of Canada. An analysis of the background of Saskatchewan 
MLA's from 1905 until 1966 demonstrates that the Liberal Party was not only supported by the 
farming community, but that, except for the Liberals in 1938, the vast majority of elected 
members from all parties were identified as having agricultural interests. See D.E. Smith, "The 
Membership of the Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly: 1905-1966 (1967) 20 Sask. Hist. 41 
at 49. 
The 1929 election resulted in a "Co-operative" government under the Conservatives with 5 
Progressive and 6 Independents lending support to the otherwise minority Conservative 
government until 1934. It was during this era that the CCF developed, with an emphasis on 
Eastern domination and control by the traditional political parties. The most radical political 
agendas of the CCF were modified and in 1944 the CCF came to power as a social reform 
party focusing on socialized health care, reforms to the conditions of collective bargaining, and 
a continuation of the earlier farmer protection programs: 
The CCF's "four-point land policy was: ( I )  protection of the farmer against 
foreclosure and eviction; (2) protection of the farmer's crop against seizure; (3) a 
moratorium to compel reduction of debts; and (4) crop failure clauses in mortgages. D.E. 
McHenry, The Third Force in Canada; The Co-operarive Commonwealth Federation, 
1932-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950) at 213. 
Table 1 briefly lists the electoral results between 1905-1944. A comprehensive description 
of Saskatchewan politics can be found in D.E. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada; The Co- 
operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1950). Chap. 7, "Saskatchewan under CCF Rule"; E. Eager, Saskatchewan Government; 
Politics and Pragmatism (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980), Chap. 4; 
Building rhe Co-operarive Commonwealth: Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in 
Canada (W.J. Brennan, ed., Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, University of Regina, 
1984) at 181. 
'' Of course, the CCF introduced a broad range of socially progressive legislative measures 
which did not generate a substantial amount of litigation, and thus have not been analyzed in 
this paper. This legislation included The Social Aid Act, S.S. 1947, c. 95, which augmented The 
Local Improvement Districts Relief Act, R.S.S. 1940, c. 160; The Municipalities Relief and 
Agricultural Aid Act, R.S.S. 1940, c. 159; and The Direct Relief Act, R.S.S. 1940, c. 158 all of 
which had been enacted during the Depression to provide direct financial assistance to indigent 
persons in Saskatchewan. 
The CCF medicare policies were represented by a series of legislative enactments beginning 
with The Saskatchewan Hospitalization Act, S.S. 1946, c.  82 and ending with The 
Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act, S.S. 1961, (2nd Sess.), c. 1. The legislation, which 
while generating extensive academic commentary did not give rise to litigation at the 
implementation and operational stages. See E.A. Tollefson, "The Medicare Settlement" (1963) 
Sask. Bar Rev. 92; E.A. Tollefson, Bitter Medicine-The Saskatchewan Medicare Feud 
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institutions by denying the enforceability of certain express contractual terms.23 
It also afforded members of the farming community positive rights against 
sellers and manufacturers of farm equipment; rights which they would not have 
enjoyed at common law. Such legislation can be considered progressive, even 
though it accepted the continued existence of private capital and ownership of 
property, through its mandatory socialization of economic risks.24 
By denying creditors the right to enforce contractual rights against farmers, 
either on an ex post or ex ante basis, some of the Acts effectively instituted a 
mandatory social insurance program. All farmers effectively paid a non-risk- 
based premium for coverage against a range of payment default risks. These 
risks were mostly related to weather and international grain markets, factors 
over which farmers had little influence, but which could prevent them from 
fulfilling their debt obligations to financial institutions. The legislation 
encompassed within this category includes:25 
(Saskatoon: Modern Press, 1964); C.H. Higginbotham, Off the Record: The C.C.F .  in 
Saskatchewan (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), Chap. 5, "Medicare." 
Similarly, the CCF introduced extremely significant legislative reforms in both employment 
standards and the collective bargaining arenas. The treatment of labour legislation in the courts 
has been extensively examined by others. Again, it is my impression that much would be 
gained by an analysis of the numerous judicial decisions on the CCF Trade Union Act, S.S. 
1944, 2nd Sess., c. 69, and related legislation, rather than by the traditional analyses of elite 
appellate decisions. 
Others have commented extensively on the way in which certain judges interfered with 
"New Deal" legislation introduced by the Federal government during the 1930's. See, for 
example, F.R. Scott, "The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions" (1937) 15 Can. Bar 
Rev. 485. 
23 AS the House of Lords said, the legislation statutorily modified contracts between two parties 
"one of which is an agriculturist but the other of which is a lender of money." Reference re The 
Farm Security Act, 1944 (Sask.) Attorney General of Saskatchewan v. Attorney General of 
Canada et al. ,  [I9491 A.C. 1 10 at 123. 
24 While legislation of this character may not seem radical today, shifting power away from the 
Eastern banks, grain merchants and farm implements dealers remained at the core of CCF 
politics throughout Saskatchewan's history. See 0 .  Melnyk, Remembering the CCF,  No  
Bankers in Heaven (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989) at 14,24. 
25 TWO related acts which are not included in this paper are The Farm Security Act, S.S. 1944, 
(2nd Sess.), c. 30 and The Agricultural Co-operarive Associations Act, S.S. 1913, c. 62. 
Subsequent legislation amending or reenacting the Agriculrural Co-operarive Associations Act 
includes S.S. 1915, c. 37; S.S. 1916, c. 37, s. 35; S.S. 1918-19, c. 68; R.S.S. 1920, c. 119; S.S. 
1920, c. 50; S.S. 1921-22, c. 52; S.S. 1923, c. 43; S.S. 1924, c. 26. The Act was repealed by 
S.S. 1928, c. 54, s. 40. 
The Farm Security Act represented an attempt to shift some of the risks of farmerldebtors to 
the lenders by declaring up to 160 acres of farmland immune from foreclosure. The legislation 
was one of the first major legislative actions of the CCF. A mortgage association immediately 
challenged the legislation and section 6 of the Act was held ultra vires the provincial 
government by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1947 in Reference re The Farm Security Act, 
1944 (Sask.) Attorney General of Saskatchewan v .  Attorney General of Canada et al., [I9471 
S.C.R. 394. An appeal was rejected by the Privy Council in November 1948, on the ground 
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I .  The Debt Adjustment A C ~ ; ~ ~  
2 .  The Limitation of Civil Rights Act;  '' and 
3. The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934." 
that the legislation was in relation to interest, and thus an intrusion on federal constitutional 
powers under section 91 of the British North America Act. See [I9491 A.C. 110. The two cases 
decided under the Farm Security Act are Canada Permanent Trust Company v. Eagleson et. 
at . ,  April 24, 1947, [I9471 1 W.W.R. 1007 and Canada Permanent Trust Company v. 
Eagleson et. al., July 12, 1948, [1948] 2 W.W.R. 675. Neither of the cases falls within the time 
period with which this paper is concerned. 
The Agricultural Co-operative Associations Act enabled a group of five or more individuals 
to incorporate for the purposes of agricultural operations. The Act did not provide for 
protection from creditors; each member of a co-operative was liable for a portion of the debts 
of the corporation in an amount comsponding to the number of shares the individual held in 
the co-operative. The Act simply allowed farmers to gather capital and share risks so as to 
operate more effectively as a group, just like any other corporation. No reported cases decided 
under The Agricultural Co-operative Associations Act were found within the time period 
covered by this paper. 
26 The Debt Adjustment Act was first enacted as S.S 1928-29, c. 53. Subsequent legislation 
amending or reenacting the Debt Adjustment Act includes R.S.S 1930, c. 162; S.S. 1931, c. 59; 
S.S. 1932, c. 51, s. 2; S.S. 1933, c. 82; S.S. 1934, c. 59; S.S. 1934-35, c. 88; R.S.S. 1940, c. 87; 
S.S. 1942, c. 15. The Act was repealed by S.S. 1943, c. 15, s. 15. 
The statute has been described as "ameliorating and life-giving" to debtors and "vicious and 
demoralizing" to creditors. See R.R. Siddall, "The Debt Adjustment Acts" (1934) 3 The 
Fortnightly Law J. 198, 214, 281. The Debt Adjustment Act was the beginning of a 
comprehensive re-organization of the rights of lenders which culminated in the Saskatchewan 
Debt Adjustment Program in 1936 and associated legislation including The Statute L a w  
Amendmenr Act, S.S. 1937, c. 95 and The Drought Area Debt Adjustment Act, S.S. 1937, c. 92. 
See G.E. Britnell, 'The Saskatchewan Debt Adjustment Program" (1937) 3 Can. J. of Econ. 
and Pol. Sci. 370. 
A comprehensive and detailed review of the debate surrounding the introduction of the Debt 
Adjustment Bill indicates that a number of financial institutions and manufacturing concerns 
including the National Trust Company, Robert Simpson Western Limited, and the International 
Harvester Company vehemently opposed the legislation. See "Co-operative Government's 
Response to the Depression, 1930- 1934" ( 197 1 ) 24 Sask. Hist. 8 1 at 89-90. 
'' The Limitation of Civil Rights Act was first enacted as S.S. 1933, c. 83. Subsequent legislation 
amending or reenacting the Act until 1945 included S.S. 1934, c. 60; S.S. 1934-35, c. 89; S.S. 
1936, c. 119; S.S. 1937, c. 94; S.S. 1939, c. 93; R.S.S. 1940, c. 88; S.S. 1941, c. 18; S.S. 1942, 
c. 19; S.S. 1943 c. 16; S.S. 1944, c. 21. The Act exists today as R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16. 
Related legislation included The Land Contracts (Actions) Act, S.S. 1943, c. 17. I have not 
organized or analyzed the cases decided under this latter Act given the date of its enactment. 
An example of one decision which interpreted the legislation restrictively is Manufacturers 
Life insurance Co. v. Williams et al., [I9451 1 W.W.R. 383 (power of court extends only to 
postpone not extinguish mortgagee's common law rights). See also, Huran & Erie Mortgage 
Corporation er al. v. Propp, (1943) 24 Can. Bank. Rep. 73 (C.A.) (decision by court refusing 
to exercise discretion to extend redemption period under mortgage). 
28 The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act was first enacted in 1934 as S.C. 1934, c. 53. 
Subsequent legislation amending or re-enacting the Act until 1945 includes S.C. 1935, cc. 20, 
61; S.C. 1938, c. 47; and S.C. 1943-44, c. 26. The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act was 
repealed by S.C. 1988, c. 2, s.68. 
The legislation permitted debtors to make a proposal to a Board of Review which could 
make a mandatory order compromising creditor claims. The legislation only applied to debts 
incurred prior to May 1, 1935 unless the creditor concurred in the proposal. While the 
legislation was generally recognized as benefiting indigent farmers, in 1939 the Supreme 
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A second set of legislation afforded employees and farmers the positive right 
to sue employers for personal injuries or suppliers of farm machinery for 
economic loss. This legislation effectively instituted a similar social insurance 
program with the same non-risk-based premiums and the same coverage, but in 
this case coverage was limited to the risk of non-payment due to defective farm 
equipment. The two examples of this legislation which I review are: 
1 .  The Workers' Compensation and 
2 .  The Farm Implement 
While both statutes had already been in force for some time when the CCF 
came to power, concerns with the working conditions of employees and with the 
market power of eastern manufacturers of farm equipment remained relevant 
throughout the early CCF era.31 
The series of statutes limiting the enforcement of contractual claims and 
affording farmers and employees rights against suppliers of farm equipment and 
employers generated substantial judicial activity in the margin of their 
applicability. Ambiguous language generated disputes which could be resolved 
either in favour of the farming community or in favour of the 
financial/manufacturing community.32 Individual judges sometimes 
Court, in an appeal from a Manitoba judgment, held that the Act applied to corporations. See In 
Re Barickman Hutterian Mutual Corporation, [I9391 S.C.R. 223. 
29 The Workers' Compensation Act was first enacted as The Workmens' Compensation 
Ordinance, O.N.W.T. 1900, c. 13. Subsequent legislation amending or reenacting the Workers' 
Compensation Act during the period under inquiry includes O.N.W.T. 1905, c. 98; S.S. 1910- 
11, c. 9; R.S.S. 1920, c. 210; S.S. 1928-29, c. 73; R.S.S. 1930, cc. 252, 253; R.S.S. 1940, cc. 
302, 303; and S.S. 1945, c. 103, s.5, and c. 104. The Workmens' Compensation Act became 
The Workers' Compensation Act in R.S.S. 1978, cc. W-17, W-18. With numerous 
amendments, The Workers' Compensation Act exists today as S.S. 1979, c. W-17.1. 
30 The Farm Implements Act was first enacted as S.S. 1915, c. 28. Subsequent legislation 
amending or reenacting the Act during the period which this paper reviews includes S.S. 1916, 
c. 26; S.S. 1917, (2nd Sess.), c. 56; R.S.S. 1920, c. 128; S.S. 1920, c. 57; S.S. 1921-22, c. 56; 
S.S. 1928, c. 57; R.S.S. 1930, c. 160; S.S. 1939, c. 72; and R.S.S. 1940, c. 199. The Farm 
Implements Act became The Farm Machinery Act as R.S.S. 1965, c. 232 and The Agricultural 
Implement Act as S.S. 1968, c. 1. It has been amended and re-enacted on numerous occasions 
since then and exists today as The Agricultural Implements Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. A-10. The Act 
provided both for the extension of contractual rights against manufacturers and for a substantial 
expansion of non-modifiable rights against sellers of farm machinery. The positive right of 
farmers to sue for economic losses against suppliers of farm machinery, effectively instituted a 
social insurance program similar to that of the more general debt relief legislation described 
above, with the same non-risk based premiums, and the same coverage-but in this case 
limited to the risk of non-payment due to defective farm equipment. 
31 For example the CCF supported the Canadian Cooperative Implements, Ltd., a tri-lateral 
arrangement of the Prairie provinces organized in 1944. See D.E. McHenry, supra, note 21 at 
241. 
32 I assume for the purposes of this analysis that the debtors in these cases were individual 
farmers and the creditors organized financial and industrial concerns. However, the legislation 
was also drafted to apply with equal force to members of the local communities who might be 
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acknowledged the political character of the interpretative judgments made in 
relation to the legislation. In Gofton e t  al. v. Shan t z  e t  a1.,33 a sub-buyer of 
mortgaged property argued that he was entitled to rely on the provisions of the 
Farmers' Cred i to rs  Ar r angemen t  A d 4  to have the mortgage debt reduced. The 
Court held that there was no relationship of debtor and creditor between the sub- 
buyer and mortgagee and that the sub-buyer could not bind the mortgagee: 
There are two views that may be put forward of the [Act]: First, that the 
benevolent operation of the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act will be 
greatly hampered unless it can be so construed as to render, subject to its 
provisions the entire affairs of the farmer seeking its benefits. If he has 
bought land subject to a mortgage ... he cannot attain full benefit of the 
statute in question unless he can be relieved from some part of the burden 
of the mortgage upon his farm.... 
The opposite and contrasted view of the statute is that it very clearly 
interferes with the rights of secured creditors and that it is important that a 
statute of this nature should be  strictly construed and kept within its 
legitimate operation.35 
Whether or not judges acknowledge their role in this way,36 one might predict 
that judicial power produced by the open meaning of language, and the inability 
or unwillingness of legislative institutions to address all possible futures, would 
be exercised in a fashion which might consistently favour the interests of either 
creditors or farmers. 
What is particularly interesting about the set of cases is that they uniformly 
deal with formal "technical" questions. The disputes typically involve: the 
applicability of the legislation to loans before or after a specified date; the 
residency requirements of the debtor; the classification of the transaction as a 
sale or lease; whether an executor of a farmer could claim the benefits of the 
legislation; whether an administrative agency made a "jurisdictional error." The 
owed money by farmers. This fact may well have triggered decisions favouring creditors in 
those cases. The manner of reporting does not permit one to discriminate between the two 
groups of creditors. See McConnell, supra, note 13 at 195. 
33 [ 1 9 3 7 1 4 ~ . ~ . ~ . 3 4 7 ( 0 n t . c . ~ . ) .  
34 Supra, note 28. 
35 Supra, note 33 at 349. 
36 F.L. Morton, ed. Law, Politics and the Judicial Process System in Canada (Calgary: University 
of Calgary Press, 1984) at 63 adopts the naive, albeit traditional, view that judges interpreting 
common law and statutes affect public policy less directly than judges interpreting 
constitutional powers. It is my view that public policy is implicated as much in describing the 
scope of legislation, and thus determining its impact in favour of a particular community, as it 
is in describing the scope of legislation in the process of validating it  for constitutional 
purposes. 
Heinonline - -  56 Sask. L. Rev. 33 1992 
34 Saskatchewan Law Review Vol. 56 
apparent political emptiness of the legal disputes and their resolution is truly 
remarkable.37 
The current debate between the more radical anti-Charter critics and liberal 
pro-Charter supporters has typically focused on Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions and other appellate decisions. These critiques offer interpretations 
which, while provocative, are usually contradicted by the judicial rhetoric and 
the equally logical arguments of the other side. Empirically analyzing a 
relatively large number of lower court decisions over time represents an attempt 
to reduce marginally the subjectivity of interpretati~n.~~ 
The difference between the traditional analysis of elite judicial decisions and 
the approach taken in this paper may be appreciated through an analysis of the 
judicial responses to the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934.39 In 1937, 
the Privy Council in Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney General 
for Canada et ~ l . , ~  upheld the Act as within the constitutional authority of the 
federal government to enact bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. This 
decision is generally viewed, in light of related decisions of the Privy Council 
and the Supreme Court of Canada, as indicating judicial support for progressive 
legislation designed to permit farmers to maintain themselves and their families 
in productive farming communities?' However, at the lower court level, the vast 
majority of decisions involving the application of the statute at the margin 
favoured the creditor rather than debtor. Does the judicial response to the Act 
indicate support for the farming community or allegiance to the interests of 
creditors? There is no doubt that looking at appellate decisions is important, but 
the image of the world through that lens is very different from the one I describe 
here. 
37 This should be contrasted with work from J.A.G. Griffiths to Joel Bakan, as examples of those 
who consistently focus on what are facially class, gender, labour/capital and other "political" 
disputes. See J.A.G. Griffiths, The Politics of the Judiciary (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1977); J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy 
in Canadian Constitutional Thought" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 123; J. Fudge, "The 
Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation 
to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485. 
" I admit that lower court decisions themselves represent an extremely narrow population of the 
relationships which are regulated by a particular legislative framework. However, it is almost 
impossible to access debtor-creditor relations which did not produce litigation. One important, 
and as yet uninvestigated source of very important data are the over 50,000 cases adjudicated 
by the federal Board of Review under the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Acr which might 
very well produce a wealth of information about the way in which that Act affected 
creditorlfarrner relations from 1934 onwards. See In Re Perrisor (1946), 27 Can. Bank. Rep. 
243 at 248. 
39 Supra, note 28. 
[I9371 1 D.L.R. 695. 
4 '  An early comment on the legislation is G.W. Forbes, "Court Decisions Concerning the 
Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Acr" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 697. 
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I have been able to collect and interpret 269 cases considering the two 
categories of legislation described above.42 Certainly, my interpretation of 
judicial outcomes and language is no more authoritative than any other, but the 
reality of legal authorship demands that my analysis operate definitively for 
these Of forty-two cases decided under the Debt Adjustment Act, 
twenty-eight (66.7%) were decided in favour of the creditors and only fourteen 
(33.3%) in favour of debtors. Of fifty-eight cases decided under the Workers' 
Compensation Act, thirty-two (55.2%) were decided in favour of creditors and 
twenty-six (44.8%) in favour of debtors. Of seventeen cases decided under The 
Limitation of Civil Rights Act, twelve (70.6%) were decided in favour of 
creditors and five (29.4%) in favour of debtors. Of fifty-eight cases considering 
The Farm Implement Act, thirty-one (53.5%) were decided in favour of sellers, 
twenty (34.5%) in favour of buyers, and seven (12%) were ambiguous. Of 
ninety-four cases decided under the Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, forty- 
nine (52.1%) were decided in favour of creditors and only forty-five, (47.9%) in 
favour of farmers. In the aggregate, 152 of the 269 decisions (57.1%) were 
decided in favour of the creditors and only 110 (40.8%) in favour of debtors, 
42 Several of these cases involve different levels of court and thus different judges interpreting the 
same legislation and facts at various trial and appellate levels. See Diewold v. Diewold (1939). 
21 Can. Bank. Rep. 242 (Sask. K.B.) (decision favouring debtor); Diewold v. Diewold (1940), 
21 Can. Bank. Rep. 370 (Sask.C.A.) (decision favouring creditor); Diewold v. Diewold, [I9411 
S.C.R. 35 (decision favouring creditor). Of the two cases decided under the Farm Security Act, 
one favoured the debtor and one the creditor. This difference is significant at the one percent 
level. 
The same analysis might be applied to cases involving common law contract claims. In this 
case the doctrinal rule will generally produce legislation involving debates about its 
applicability of common law rules to specific facts and one might engage in an analysis of 
these cases to determine whether the cases, in the aggregate, reveal a systemic bias. See 
Lynberg v. Tarbox (1908). 1 Sask. L. R. 492 (claim by manufacturer of threshing machine on 
an assignment by purchaser of money earned with machine; held for creditor on claim for 
money earned with part of machine); Grimes v. Gaurhier (1908). 1 Sask. L. R. 54 (claim by 
chattel mortgagee for full value of machine seized and sold by mortgagor, held for debtor since 
sale by mortgagee was not carried out with proper care to secure highest price); Hopkins v. 
Danroth (1908), 1 Sask. L.R. 225 (claim by conditional vendor for deficiency after 
repossession, held for vendor, resale did not rescind contract). Anyone interested in the list of 
cases analyzed may obtain it from the editors of the Saskatchewan Law Review or from the 
author directly. 
43 In assessing the cases, I have ignored decisions in which judges addressed the constitutional 
validity of provincial statutes or programs. I have also ignored legislation which dealt with 
conflicts between farmers and small tradespeople. See An Act Respecting Threshers' Liens, 
R.S.S. 1909, c. 152 considered in Rudy v. Sonmore (1915-16), 9 Sask. L.R. 267. As well, I 
have not distinguished among the various levels of court in determining whether the decision 
favoured the creditor or debtor, financial institution or debtor, manufacturing concern or buyer 
as the case may be. I have also not attempted to determine any temporal pattern to the 
decisions either in relation to the introduction of the legislation, or to external variables such as 
local or national elections or the economic circumstances affecting the community. Finally, I 
have not included cases which I could only classify as ambiguous in terms of whether the 
decision favoured one or other of the parties. See, for example, McDougall v. McDougall et 
al., (1918-19). 12 Sask. L.R. 289 (wife's interest in homestead limited to 160 acres, but still 
applies to property notwithstanding that husband owned only a one-half interest). 
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while seven (2.1%) were ambiguous. This difference is significant at the one 
percent 
The results of my analysis offer some limited support to those who have 
argued against simplistic assertions of judicial neutrality in understanding the 
relationship of politics and the judiciary.45 That is, one can argue that a creditor 
success rate of 65% on cases which should offer an equal probability of success 
or failure to both creditors and debtors, demonstrates that for whatever reason- 
class identification, an interest in preserving capital, concerns with attracting 
investment, the inability of debtors to express their position persuasively- 
judges favoured financial institutions and manufacturing parties who loaned 
capital or produced goods or services over fanners and debtors. 
IV. ARE THERE LESSONS FROM HISTORY? 
Little would be gained from speculating on the reasons for Seymour Lipset's 
failure to recognize the relevance of the political character of judges and of the 
various and subtle ways in which judicial power could interfere with the ability 
of elected institutions to fulfil political mandates.46 However, it would appear 
44 Unlike some analyses of aggregated case law, I have not attempted to describe and assess the 
judicial discourse contained in these 269 cases. Such criteria as language, structure and form, 
rhetorical and metaphorical devices and selection of facts, are the traditional sources of 
analysis of reasons for judgment which one comes across in legal literature. I decided against 
engaging in that exercise for several reasons. First, reasons for judgement may very well be 
thought of as judicial rationalization. While the reasons make an interesting focus for inquiry if 
one is concerned as to why judges would want to publicize one set of ideas over another, they 
may not reveal very much at all about the complex and perhaps unknowable motivating 
influences in particular cases. Second, this research was designed to answer questions about the 
existence of judicial or institutional bias and one might predict that there would be little 
explicit reference to that issue in public reasons for judgment. Third, this research is concerned 
with the impact of legal institutions on a particular class of litigants in individual cases and in 
the vast majority of cases that impact would have been totally independent of the reasons for 
judgment given by particular judges. Fourth, even a cursory review of these cases indicates that 
they contain little more than a brief recitation of selected facts, an equally brief description of 
law, and a conclusion. While one might speculate as to why some facts were included while 
others were excluded and engage in technical legal analysis to demonstrate the availability of 
equally coherent legal outcomes, the cases themselves are not rich sources of reasons, ideas, 
values or anything else which might reveal much about the judicial mind. Most of these were 
lower court decisions, decided on financially "trivial" claims from the perspective of creditors, 
and they did not generate the extensive judicial opinion, writing and debate which 
characterizes modem constitutional litigation. Finally, the decisions were made between 1910 
and 1945, when the style of judicial writing in these kinds of cases can only be described as 
minimalist and which, even in major cases, addressed "technical" legal issues and little else. 
45 Griffiths, supra, note 37. 
46 Seymour Lipset implies that the Canadian courts in 1950 were somehow apolitical, 
characterized by deference and neutrality in political matters. See S.M. Lipset, Continental 
Divide: The Values and Instifurions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 
1990). 
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that the data supports the recent theorizing that the legalization of politics may 
obstruct progressive legislative action. My analysis of the cases suggests that at 
least one group of judges consistently made interpretative choices which were 
insensitive to the needs of one of the less powerful groups in the Prairie 
community. 
However, one must be cautious about engaging in simplistic interpretations of 
the data in support of claims that judges exhibited personalized class bias. The 
presence of a statistically significant imbalance in outcomes indicates only that 
more cases were decided in favour of creditors than debtors, and that the 
outcome is not a product of random variation. There are two further questions 
which remain to be addressed in considering the meaning of the data and its 
significance today. 
First, we need to understand the depth of the ideas which produced the result. 
That is, while the imbalance of outcomes of the cases is significant, its 
implication for modem Charter theorists depends on one's sense of the depth 
and breadth of the attitudes which generated the decisions. Judges might have 
been insensitive to farmers in a way unique to that time and place. If that is true, 
the data may not tell us very much about the way in which modern political 
debates will unfold in the courts. 
Second, we need to understand why that imbalance in outcomes occurred. 
There may be different variables which affected the outcomes of cases involving 
creditors and debtors. These variables may present important qualifications on 
attempts to employ the data to support an interpretation which would challenge 
the alleged neutrality of individual judges, judicial institutions or the law itself 
as a social institution. 
A. THE POSITION OF THE FARMING COMMUNITY 
We must recognize that the farming community as an oppressed group in 
Saskatchewan differs dramatically from other groups such as: organized labour, 
Certainly one can identify a theme of "rationalism" and "technical" expertise and 
professionalism which pervades at least some political analyses of judicial decision-making in 
contract and other common law areas. See Morton, supra, note 36 at 62-65. As late as 1965, 
John Porter in The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) at 416, while 
recognizing the political patronage issue in senior judicial appointments, went on to describe a 
judicial role "marked by impartiality, rational inquiry, and attention to fact." 
What seems to have happened is that many political scientists and sociologists accepted 
without criticism the classic model of judicial decision-making and ignored the wealth of legal 
scholarship in Canada dating from at least the Depression, and certainly from the end of the 
Second World War, which was influenced by the American Realist tradition. See F.R. Scott, 
"The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 485; B. Laskin, 
"'Peace, Order and Good Government' Re-Examined" (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 1054; W. 
Friedmann, "Judges, Politics and the Law" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 81 1. 
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Aboriginal peoples, immigrants, the poor, and women whose interests might be 
prejudiced by the wielding of judicial power under the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The farming community, once organized, could and often did 
dramatically influence political events. It represented a well organized and 
politically powerful voice in the electorate of Saskatchewan during the period 
under study. The absolute numbers, the potential and actual political power, and 
the importance of the farming community to the economic and social situation 
of the province are not characteristics shared by most groups who have recently 
raised concerns about judicial power in Canada. While judges might have been 
expected to be sensitive to the suffering of the farmers as a politically 
empowered group, they were not. The data might have been much more one- 
sided had the farmers been as isolated and marginalized as are many of the 
potential beneficiaries of progressive legislation today. If the data indicates bias 
in these historical circumstances, one should not be sanguine about the ability of 
politically disempowered and marginalized groups to sensitize modem judges to 
their respective situations. 
It is also possible that Saskatchewan judges considering the legislation would 
have recognized it as an attempt to shift wealth from financial institutions and 
corporations with resources outside of Saskatchewan-from central Canada-to 
the farming community within the pr~vince.~' The current Charter debate rarely 
permits one to conclude that judicial decisions in favour of oppressed groups 
would redistribute substantial amounts of wealth into the particular region in 
which the oppressed group and the judges reside. It must have been obvious that 
decisions in favour of debtors might well have benefited Saskatchewan at the 
expense of central Canada. The fact that the data favours creditors further 
strengthens the interpretation of the data as indicating an extremely powerful 
bias in favour of creditors. 
Such a regional bias might have been augmented by judicial sensitivity to the 
unique circumstances of farmers in Saskatchewan during the Depression. The 
suffering of the farming community in Saskatchewan may have been conceived 
as a product of "nature." The "naturally" disadvantaged farmers might have been 
treated more compassionately than those whose disadvantage was construed by 
the judges as a matter of individual choice, or at least of personal responsibility. 
Sympathy with farmers as victims of nature could have led to decisions in their 
favour, given that farming success or failure during the first half of the century 
in Saskatchewan was often a product of weather and international grain markets 
rather than of individual initiative or effort. One has a sense that the needs of 
labour, Aboriginal Peoples, immigrants, women and other groups today, are 
47 A problem with the cases is that they do not identify the residency of the disputants and thus it 
is difficult to verify this interpretation. A related problem is that the legislation was applied to 
individual creditorslsellers in some cases and I have been unable to disaggregate the cases on 
that basis. 
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often perceived by judges as a product of those individuals failing to take 
advantage of their abilities and opportunitie~.~~ That the historical data evidences 
a bias even in the case of "innocent" victims may indicate that the position of 
other groups who are unable to generate a sympathetic attitude might be much 
worse today. 
Much of the legislation, and a substantial percentage of the cases, occurred 
during an economic crisis unique to the Canadian experience. No immediate 
crisis relevant to the position of disadvantaged groups exists in the minds of 
judges today. Again, one might have expected the judiciary to be sensitive either 
to the magnitude and severity of the suffering experienced by individual 
members of the farming community in Sa~katchewan?~ or to the risk of direct 
challenges to the economic and political order. Analogues to those risks are 
difficult to identify today. Certainly, with per capita income falling 72% from 
1928 to 1933 an argument can be made that the circumstances of  aska at chew an 
farmers during the Depression had reached crisis  proportion^.^^ It is reinarkable 
that decisions in these crisis circumstances favoured creditors, and that this bias 
existed in the face of economic crisis suggests that the situation of many 
disadvantaged groups today would be far worse. 
Finally, all the above legislation while progressive in a limited sense, was 
enacted by Liberal provincial governments or by the Bennett government in 
Ottawa. Many proponents of the legislation admitted that it was not radical, and 
indeed it only provided for a modest and likely temporary period of 
consolidation for the farming community faced with drought, collapsing 
international wheat markets and limited capital reserves. The mainstream 
political parties' parentage most likely attenuated the impact of judicial political 
affiliation. Had the legislation been introduced by a democratic socialist 
provincial government, the ideological opposition would have been greater." 
48 It is interesting to note that at least one judge alluded to individual responsibility in refusing to 
permit a farmer to avoid his contractual obligations under an executed transaction which did 
not comply with the Farm Implement Act. See Haubrich v. Keefner, [I9221 1 W.W.R. 1079 (to 
permit the farmer to obtain the benefits of the machine and then avoid his obligations by acting 
opportunistically would "make the statute an instrument of fraud).  
49 The depth and magnitude of the economic disaster experienced by farmers in Saskatchewan 
should not be underestimated. For example, the average yield per acre of wheat in 
Saskatchewan, which exceeded 25 bushels in 1925, had fallen to a low of 2.7 bushels in 1937. 
The estimated net income from wheat fell from $218 million in 1928 to only $42.3 million in 
1933 to $17.8 million in 1937. Export prices fell almost 50% from 1929 to 1933. See W.T. 
Easterbrook & H.G.J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956) at 476- 
514. The suffering was not limited to farmers, but extended as well to thousands of seasonal 
farm workers. See L.A. Brown, "Unemployment Relief Camps in Saskatchewan, 1933-1936 
(1970) 23 Sask. Hist. 81. 
See P.A. Russell, "Co-operative Government's Response to the Depression, 1930-1934" 
(1971) 24 Sask. Hist. 81. 
" This is especially true when one looks at the judicial treatment of the Federal Farmers' 
Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934. 
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This makes the data all the more remarkable, and suggests that any current fears 
that the judiciary will interfere with legislation introduced by democratic 
socialist provincial governments may be justified. 
Furthermore, the legislation, while progressive, could be viewed as a self- 
financing insurance scheme, with wealth distribution taking place within the 
farming community, not from the financial/manufacturing communities to the 
 farmer^.^' So long as progressive legislation is directed at modifying substantive 
relationships in market transactions, one can be assured that the redistributive 
impact will be confined to those within the disadvantaged group. The 
legislation, while socializing risk, does so among the expected beneficiaries of 
the regulatory intervention. It is anything but radical legislative intervention in 
the marketplace. Understanding the legislation in that fashion, judges could have 
decided the cases in favour of debtors without significant concern that, over the 
long run, the position of creditors would have been prejudiced. The fact that the 
judiciary did not do so strengthens one's sense of the creditor bias reflected in 
the cases, and supports those who have argued that truly redistributive 
legislation may be at risk in the modem era of judicial hegemony. 
Taken together, these ideas could just as well have combined to produce much 
more "neutral" data. One could have predicted that the Saskatchewan judiciary 
might have been more sensitive to the needs of the farming community than was 
the case. The particular context in which these decisions were made permits an 
interpretation of the data favouring creditors on the basis of class as reflecting a 
much stronger and more pervasive bias than might appear on a mere quantitative 
analysis. 
B. NON-CLASS VARIABLES 
There are several other ideas which make the analysis even more difficult to 
interpret. The first is that any interpretation of the data as evidencing systemic 
personal judicial bias may be incorrect if one relaxes an important assumption 
underlying the analysis so far. Until now, I have assumed that the outcomes in 
the 269 cases were independent of all variables except for the character of the 
parties as either a debtor or creditor. For example, the cases do not control for 
such variables as the age of the parties, the residency of the parties, the impact of 
the judgment on the local community, explanations for the non-payment of the 
" That is, one could assume that the lending institutions or manufacturers would charge a fixed 
premium reflecting the increased risk of non-recovery on default, or the increased risk of 
lawsuits associated with defective machinery. The result of this non-risk based premium would 
be to force low risk farmers to subsidize high risk farmers. Since all creditors and 
manufacturers were treated alike, any increased costs associated with calculating the premium 
would be passed on to the debtors/buyers. 
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money owing. In any event, one might plausibly argue that those kinds of factors 
did not vary in any systematic way with class across the cases. 
However, a critical factor which certainly would have influenced the outcome 
of such disputes, and one which is almost certainly correlated with the class of 
the plaintiff or defendant, is the legal resources and legal expertise available to 
the parties. My analysis has assumed that access to legal resources and expertise 
is independent of wealth, organizational structure and debtorlcreditor class.53 I 
have assumed that, apart from class, the outcomes of the cases ought to have 
been equally divided among debtors and creditors. 
However, a more realistic assumption is that creditors would have been able to 
invest considerably more money than debtors faced with the imminent loss of 
their farms. More importantly, creditors, as "repeat-players" in debt enforcement 
litigation, would often have made rational decisions to invest substantially more 
resources in order to pursue a claim in an individual case than would the debtor 
in that same case. Further, if one assumes that the quality of legal advice and the 
outcome of litigation is directly related to the amount invested, then my earlier 
interpretation of class bias may be incomplete. The data may be a product of 
institutional design factors-reflecting the use of markets to distribute legal 
services to both impoverished debtors and financial and industrial concerns- 
which produce results systematically favouring the latter two groups. Of course, 
once one admits this, then the entire legal system is implicated in the obstruction 
of progressive legi~la t ion.~~ Moreover, the phenomenon of systemic institutional 
bias, whether or not it augments systemic personal bias, equally implicates the 
law as part of a complicated political process.55 
There is no material in the literature of the era which sheds light on the impact 
of litigation strategies on case outcomes. It might, however, be possible to 
analyze the cases using a different set of parameters which, at least in theory, 
might offer some assistance in exploring this hypothesis. As noted earlier, the 
study encompasses 269 cases. One might attempt to allocate the cases into any 
one of several categories. A first set might involve cases determined by pure 
53 AS well, one might posit that the judges would have been more familiar with the lawyers 
representing creditors, and thus would have been more comfortable with the arguments which 
their colleagues were making as compared with their attitude towards lawyers representing 
destitute farmers. 
54 This systemic bias is supported by a study of the availability of legal assistance in criminal and 
civil matters in Saskatchewan, which concluded that in 1965 "there is no assistance in civil 
litigation for an indigent." See J.G. Anderson, "The Law versus the Poor in Saskatchewan" 
(1965) 30 Sask. Bar Rev. 126 at 134. 
55 I should acknowledge another institutional factor which might have produced outcomes 
favouring creditors. If debtors were undertaking litigation as part of a broadly based political 
strategy, one might have expected that some significant percentage of "losing" cases might 
have been taken in order to pursue either long term legal agendas, or non-legal agendas. 
However, in my reading of the literature describing the litigation in this era, there is no 
mention of an organized farmer litigation strategy. 
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findings of fact; a second set might involve the application of statutory 
provisions to particular facts; a third set might involve issues of retroactivity and 
retrospectivity; a fourth set might raise procedural issues; and a final set might 
involve questions of judicial review of administrative decisions. One might 
expect creditors to invest greater resources and perhaps succeed in a larger 
percentage of cases in the set of cases which have long-run implications (for 
example, in the set of cases generating issues of judicial review), as compared to 
the set of cases which will have little if any precedential values (for example, the 
set of cases involving pure fact determinati~ns).~~ 
Viewing judicial behaviour as an unreflective, abstract reasoning process, 
which focuses on the application of formal, rational rules, and operates within a 
system which limits access to information about the implications of judicial 
choices, and which utilizes an extremely limited form of discourse in judicial 
institutions, also complicates the interpretation of the data as showing systemic 
bias. This is reinforced by the socialization of lawyers and judges by which 
those characteristics become invisible. They operate largely at an unconscious 
level and represent a pervasive part of the law and legal decision-making. This 
particular understanding of the law and the way in which judges are constrained 
in their choices suggests that legal determinacy is a product of training and 
reflective socialization in which one's ability to understand the world is 
narrowed over time.57 
This understanding of the law appears in the present context through the 
application of a "fundamental tenet" of interpretation. Judges may have believed 
or had faith in the idea that legislation is not intended to affect (or ought not to 
be interpreted as affecting) existing legal entitlements. Put another way, the 
judiciary would not interpret legislation as expropriating judicially-created 
contract and property rights unless the legislation was unambiguous and 
permitted no other interpretati~n.'~ This interpretative rule might have been 
'6 An attempt was made to cany out this analysis on the 269 cases which comprised that data 
base for this study. However, it was not possible, with a sufficient degree of confidence in the 
accuracy of the choices demanded by such a study, to allocate a substantial percentage of the 
cases under review to any one particular category. 
57 Alan Hutchinson and I have developed this idea in an earlier paper. See D. Cohen and A.C. 
Hutchinson, "Of Persons and Property: The Politics of Legal Taxonomy" (1990) Dal. Law J. 
20. 
58 This idea was reflected in two complementary interpretative rules operating throughout this 
era. The first is a presumption against the alteration of common law rights, and the rule that 
legislation should not be taken as affecting the common law unless it uses words which point 
unmistakenly to that conclusion. See W.F. Craies, A Treatise on Statute Law (2nd ed., 191 I) at 
302, to W.F. Craies, A Treatise on Statute Law (6th ed., S.G.G. Edgar ed., 1963) at 336; 
Greville v. Parker, [I9101 A.C. 335 (clear words necessary to interpret legislation to confer 
relief on persons "not specially meritorious"); City National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson, 
[I9521 2 Q.B. 648. 
The second rule was consistent with the first, but focused specifically on legislative 
modification of contract rights. It provided that any construction should be rejected if it would 
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operating to influence judicial outcomes without a conscious understanding of 
its political content and without any suggestion of conspiratorial bias in favour 
of creditors. The judgments which I considered often spoke in the formal 
language of preserving the legal status quo.59 
In this case, as in the case of resource asymmetries, the systemic biases 
become institutional rather than class-based. All of this simply reinforces one's 
interpretation of the data as evidencing personal judicial bias. It suggests that the 
bias was more complicated and more deeply imbedded in legal operations than 
consciously designed prejudices. To the extent that these ideas remain part of the 
law today, one should not be optimistic about the position of disadvantaged 
groups under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as interpreted by the judiciary. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is considerable doubt regarding 
the legitimacy of my interpretation of the meaning of a balance between 
decisions favouring the farming community and decisions favouring the 
financial/manufacturing firms. I have presented the data on the assumption that a 
"neutral" judiciary would have produced results which would not have varied 
with class-roughly one half of the cases would have been decided in favour of 
debtors, and one half in favour of creditors. Thus, the data produced-favouring 
c r e d i t o r s ~ a n  be interpreted as evidence of judicial, or systemic institutional 
bias in that direction. However, I think that the analysis is much more complex 
than that. 
Viewing the balance as indicating a relative degree of political impartiality in 
the judiciary assumes that there is one "correct" interpretation of the relevant 
legislation, and that the legal advisors to both groups accurately identified their 
respective situations as being close to the line. A balance in outcomes would 
have indicated that the judges, acting in an unbiased fashion, responded to 
something other than class in arriving at the particular judicial solution in each 
case. On those assumptions, my conclusion as to the political independence of 
the result might be supportable. 
However, a very different set of assumptions might lead to a very different 
interpretation of the data. One might posit that there is no single correct answer 
to the question as to how legislation should be interpreted-that some legislators 
enable a person to impair his contractual obligation by his own act. See F. Stroud, Maxwell on 
the Interpretation of Srarures, (5th ed., 1912) at 332, to R. Wilson & B. Galpin, Maxwell on the 
Interpretation of Sratutes, (I lth ed., 1962) at 200. 
This common law interpretative rule contradicts the explicit legislative direction contained 
in the Saskatchewan Interpretation Act which from 1907 onwards stated that all legislation was 
deemed remedial and was to be accorded a fair, liberal construction and interpretation to 
achieve its legislative object. The Interpreration Act, S.S. 1907, c .  4, s.2; The lnterprerarion 
Acr, R.S.S. 1965, c .  I ,  s.1 I .  
59 See, for example, J.I. Case Threshing Company v. Whitney, [I9221 3 W.W.R. 643 where the 
Court of Appeal refused to apply the Farm Implement Act retrospectively, and expressed 
concern that "if the section were held to apply to transactions that took place before the Act 
came into force contractual obligations would be prejudiced." Ibid. at 648. 
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might have wanted the outcome to go in one fashion, that other legislators might 
have wanted a different result, that creditors would have wanted a third and so 
on. In this world, judges might, as a class, be predicted to produce a fourth 
outcome. Based on a population of cases, lawyers would attempt to predict the 
judicial outcome. On that basis, they would only bring forward cases which they 
predict would be successful. On that analysis, the cases ought to have been 
equally distributed in favour of creditors and debtors whether the judges were 
neutral or biased in either direction! 
Neutral data is a product of nothing more than a smoothly functioning legal 
system, which produces disputes. Given any set of predicted judicial behaviour, 
and any judicial bias, lawyers will litigate cases close to the line, and judges will 
produce outcomes equally distributed on each side. It is the location of the line 
which is important, and looking at these cases tells us little about that. 
However, I think that one can and should take this analysis one step further. If 
all of the above is true, then the explanation for data which present an imbalance 
in outcomes must go beyond a static conception of bias, whether personal or 
institutional. One possible explanation for the data might be that the judges were 
constantly shifting the line in favour of the creditors over time. When acting for 
debtors, lawyers who predicted the outcome of cases using an historical lens 
would be expected to over-estimate the chances of success. It is this error which 
produces the imbalance in outcomes in a way which is dependent on class.60 
This hypothesis, which is the only one that explains the imbalance in outcomes, 
incorporates a much more dynamic conception of the way in which judicial 
attitudes, and thus decision-making, manifest themselves in case law over time.61 
V. CONCLUSION 
One engages in empirical research on law in the hope of reducing the 
ambiguity of the interpretative exercise which characterizes legal discourse. The 
60 One could, however, posit that lawyers would predict the dynamic behaviour of judges and 
correct their predictions to take into account a particular rate of change. If that is so, then the 
imbalance of outcomes favouring creditors might be due to a shift in the rare of change, which 
is not accounted for by the legal advisors for the debtor community. 
61 The hypothesis might be tested through an analysis of the outcome of the cases over time. If 
the theory is correct, (and if every other factor which might influence the outcome over time is 
held constant) one might find a rough balance in outcomes at the outset of litigation on a 
specific piece of legislation, and an increasing imbalance as the body of case law matures. 
However, and this is extremely important, if the legal advisors are cognizant of litigation 
trends, they could be expected to incorporate that into their predictions of outcomes- 
producing a constant balance of outcomes between debtors and creditors over time 
notwithstanding the judicial shift-all they need to know is the rate of change. If that is true, 
then the imbalance must be a product of an unanticipated change in the rate of change, 
representing an acceleration in the extent and degree of bias over time. 
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case law which I describe, taken in the aggregate, is intended to inform the 
debate about the connection between law and politics, about the implications 
legal hegemony and ultimately about the relationship between legal and 
representative institutions. However, the meaning of the data remains uncertain. 
Nonetheless, I have attempted to demonstrate that there are many indications 
that the data may evidence a deeply held legal antipathy towards economically 
disadvantaged groups, which manifests itself in individual decisions on 
legislation enacted for their benefit. 
In 1932, Prime Minister R.B. Bennett responded to labour unrest by 
suggesting that those who advocated progressive change would "destroy law and 
order and dem~cracy ."~~  My analysis of 269 cases decided under progressive 
legislation suggests that it was law and order exercised through the interpretive 
power of the judiciary which represented and still represents a disturbing 
challenge to democracy in Canada. Law and order is constituted in a traditional 
set of legal institutions, forms of judicial rhetoric and the exercise of power 
through interpretation by an elite judiciary. As one reflects on the experiences of 
the farming community in Saskatchewan under "progressive7' legislation (which 
might not have been that progressive at all), the outcome of the current debate 
regarding the place of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canadian law and 
politics becomes sadly predictable. 
Tragically, this relationship between the law and politics, and the sense of 
disempowerment of members of the farming community in Saskatchewan, 
continues today. Farm foreclosures in Saskatchewan currently occur at a rate of 
120 per month. David Ashdown, an Anglican Minister, writes an essay on "The 
Tale of a Man Destroyed" in which he describes the farmers he knows as victims 
of "international grain markets, the intricacies of the legal system, the vagaries 
of financial institutions, and government policies."63 One has to wonder whether 
legislation introduced today in response to of human tragedy which occurred 
half a century ago, would be received any differently by the judiciary.64 
62 Cited in 0. Melnyk, Remembering the CCF, No Bankers in Heaven (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1989) at 3. 
63 D. Ashdown, "The Tale of a Man Destroyed Vancouver Sun, (5 February 1991) A9. 
The article, with full supporting documentation, has also been printed with the permission of 
the Saskarchewan Law Review in Canadian Legal History Project, CLHP-WPS-92-18 under 
the same title. 
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